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GENERAL COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE FRENCH
CONSTITUTION
ROLAND DRAGO*
The French Constitution of October 4, 1958 is about to enter
its third year and it is already possible to give a comprehensive
opinion of the form of government which it has instituted. The cur-
rent government is popularly called the Fifth Republic though there
has been no break, with regard to fundamental principles, from the
government which preceded it.
A reading of the text submitted to public referendum on the 28th
of September might already have shown what idealogical basis the
new constitution had in the mind of General de Gaulle. It indicates
also what precedents in recent parliamentary projects or in compara-
tive constitutional law were influential.
But for two years this text, more than any other, has been put
to the test of events. To be sure, in constitutional law, practices,
customs, traditions and habits play a role almost as important as the
text itself. And it is always in the first years of a regime that these
practices are created and this custom is born. The government which
arose from the constitution of 1958, however, has taken a direction
rather different from what one might have suspected from simply
reading it. This evolution is no doubt due in part to the personality
of General de Gaulle, who was elected president of the Republic.
But it is due perhaps just as much to a general tendency of the present
era, in democratic countries, to strengthen the executive branch of
government, a tendency which owes as much to technological motives
as to the general evolution of the position of nations in the world.
In this study it is proposed to undertake a general examination
of the French political system, taking into consideration the text as
well as constitutional practice. This order is characterized first of
all by a new arrangement of the relationship between the govern-
ment and the Parliament, with the aim of assuring an equilibrium
which the French application of the parliamentary system had not
often enjoyed. But it emerged quite as much-and perhaps more so
in the eyes of the average observer-as a strengthening of the presi-
dential office.
These are the two parts which this study will include.' Juridicial
* Professor of Law, University of Lille, France.
1 The bibliography relative to French constitutional order is already too extensive
to be included in entirety. Only the principal sources will therefore be indicated.
The text of the constitution (92 articles) together with the organic laws was
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and political problems involving the community which the French
Republic forms with overseas nations will be omitted; first of all
because I propose to study only the French political order, and sec-
ondly because this community is in the process of being formed and
it is impossible to give a final opinion about it.
ARRANGEMENT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT
The system instituted by the constitution of October 4, 1959,
is a democratic and a parliamentary system.
The democratic character of the system is expressed in the Pre-
amble of the constitution, which connects it directly with the Declara-
tion of the Rights of Man of 1789 and with the Preamble of the
constitution of 1946. The latter text completed the declaration of
rights by recognizing "as particularly necessary to our times" a certain
number of economic and social rights which are added to the political
rights. These two proclamations of principles must be considered
today as belonging to positive law and are applied by the courts as
"general principles of law."2
On the other hand articles 2 and 3 of the constitution take up
again the whole body of traditional principles in France. In particular
it is reaffirmed that "sovereignty belongs to the people who exercise
it through their representatives and through the power of referendum"
(art. 3). In addition, for the first time in France, the constitutional
existence of political parties is established (art. 4).
As for the parliamentary character of the system, this was pre-
scribed by the constitutional law of June 3, 1958, authorizing the
government to establish a constitutional draft which would be sub-
mitted to the referendum. Indeed, one finds in the political insti-
tutions the traditional elements of the republican parliamentary
system such as France has practiced it since 1875, that is, a President
published by the "Imprimerie des journaux officiels" (no. 1119, 1959). The "Travaux
pr~paratoires" are being published by the "Documentation franqaise," a service attached
to the Prime Minister. Tome I (Opinions and Debates of the Constitutional Consulta-
tion Committee) appeared in 1960. Finally, it is useful to cite an official "Commentaire"
of the Constitution, also published by "Documentation franaise." (Notes et etudes
documentaires, no. 2530, 1959).
Among the works devoted to the constitution I shall cite: M. Duverger, "La
Vwme R~publique," Paris (Presses universitaires), 1959 and J. Chatelain, "La nou-
velle Constitution et le regime politique de la France," Paris (Berger-Levrault),
(2d ed. 1960). Finally it is also necessary to refer to numerous special studies published
since 1958 in the "Revue du droit public et de la science politique" (R.D.P.) and in
the "Revue frangaise de science politique" (R.F.S.P.).
2 V. J. Georgel, "Aspects du pr6ambule de la Constitution du 4 octobre 1958,"
R.D.P. 85 et seq. (1960).
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not responsible except in the case of high treason (art. 68), and a
government responsible before Parliament (art. 20). In fact this
responsibility may be called up only before the National Assembly,
elected directly by universal suffrage. As for the Senate, whose mem-
bers are elected through indirect suffrage by the representatives of
local communities, it exercises only legislative power and has no
power to raise the question of governmental responsibility (art. 49).
In this regard the constitution of 1958 continues the system of 1946.1
If the traditional institutions of the parliamentary system are
found in the constitution, however, its authors endeavored to arrange
the relationship between the institutions so as to establish between
them an equilibrium which did not exist before.
The essential defect of French parliamentarianism since 1875
had been a chronic ministerial instability, due to the fact that coalition
governments were powerless before a parliament which controlled
their actions at all times.' The desuetude of the right of dissolution,
used only twice and then unskillfully in 1877 and 1955 accentuated
this disequilibrium still more. In fact France was practicing "monist
parliamentarianism," placing the government in the hands of the
Parliament, a system closer to rule of the assembly than to parliamen-
tarianism as it exists in England.
But inversely the omnipotent Parliament could not do everything
and thus granted, extra-constitutionally, important delegations of
power to the government. Such is the application of the "laws of full
powers" or the "laws of special powers" which became almost chronic
beginning in 1926 and which the constitution of 1946, despite a formal
statement (art. 13), could not prevent.
The constitution of 1958 attempts to guard against disequilibrium
in these two directions by limiting parliamentary prerogatives in the
exercise of the legislative function as well as in control of govern-
mental action. To regulate the conflicts which might arise in this
area, a special body, the Constitutional Council, has been created.
Only more experience will show whether, in struggling against the
excessive power of Parliament, the strict limitation of parliamentary
jurisdiction has been carried too far. The point of balance in this
matter is always difficult to find.
3 The government does have the option of "asking the Senate's approval for a
declaration of general policy" (art. 49, al. 4), but the vote to intervene cannot constitute
a sanction.
4 V. A. Soulier, "L'instabilit6 minist6rielle sous la fll1me R6publique," thse Stras-
bourg, 1939; M. Merle, "L'instabilit6 minist~rielle sous ]a IV~me R.publique," R.D.P.
390 (1951).
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THE LIMITATION OF PARLIAMENTARY JURISDICTION IN
CONTROLLING GOVERNMENTAL ACTION
In certain respects the new system re-establishes the regular
principles of a parliamentarianism from which the constitution of
1946 had deviated. But in other areas, by far the most important, it
institutes new rules destined to "rationalize" the parliamentary
system.
Nomination of the Prime Minister and of the Ministers
The choice of a government, in a parliamentary system, devolves
on the Chief of State. The latter, because he is placed above party
politics, has the power to choose the one who will direct the govern-
mental team. Election by Parliament also obviously places the head
of the government in the power of the assembly and is a visible sign
of "conventional" government behind which a one-party order may
be quite easily concealed.
Article 8 of the constitution abandons the complex practices of
the Fourth Republic and decides that "the President of the Republic
names the Prime Minister." Of course, the Prime Minister so named
must receive a vote of confidence from the Chambers. It is charac-
teristic to note that M. Michel Debr6, named Prime Minister in Feb-
ruary of 1959 presented himself before the Parliament to have his
program and the make-up of his government approved. In doing so
he re-established in the customary manner the practice current
since 1875 and which the system of 1946 had already partially re-
established.
As for the members of the Cabinet, they are named by the
President on the suggestion of the Prime Minister and their duties
are terminated in the same way (art. 8, al. 2). Thus in making
ministerial changes the Prime Minister makes his own decisions and
is not obliged to obtain the consent of Parliament. This practice,
which has been common since 1946 is consistent with the theory of
the parliamentary system and introduces more cohesion (one might
even say more discipline) into the government's action. It really
makes the Prime Minister the head of the Cabinet. To be sure this
supremacy exists only if the decisions of the Prime Minister do not
meet the unshakeable opposition of the Parliament and it finds itself
in certain respects linked with the responsibility of the government.
Nevertheless, at the time of the numerous ministerial changes which
have been made since 1959 the government has always implicitly
obtained the consent of the National Assembly.'
5 See however the diverse reactions aroused in public opinion by the departure of
M. Pinay, Minister of Finance, in the newspaper Le Monde, January 16, 1960.
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"Rationalization" of the Parliamentary System
Since the Weimar constitution politicians and jurists have been
striving to rationalize the parliamentary system, that is, to discover
the procedures which prevent it from resulting in dire consequences.
Indeed the precedent is not encouraging. .. But the attempts are
always made in this direction, as for example in the Fundamental Law
of the German Federal Republic. There are three procedures here:
the incompatibility of parliamentary and ministerial functions; the
procedure of oral questions with debate; and the engagement of
ministerial responsibility.
A. Incompatability of Parliamentary and Ministerial Functions6
This incompatability, set forth in article 23 of the constitution,
was presented at the time of the drawing up of the text of the consti-
tution as a means of fighting against ministerial instability, which
arises in part from the ambitions of members of the Parliament who
wish to become ministers. If they know that in doing so they cease to
be members of the Parliament for the duration of the session, their
ambitions are restrained somewhat.
In fact, however, this practice, which is not new and which is
found in France in the constitutions of the Revolution and in that of
1852, is quite contrary to the very spirit of the parliamentary system.
Constituting a government with non-parliamentarians (or with former
parliamentarians), when it is not a sign of an authoritarian regime,
is the sign of presidential rule. When the number of "technicians"
in a government becomes larger than the number of parliamentarians
a form of presidential government necessarily evolves, for ministerial
solidarity obviously loses significance. 7
B. Oral Questions with Debate
Article 48, paragraph 2 of the constitution provides that "one
meeting per week is reserved by priority for questions from members
of the Parliament and for answers by the government." Thus a prac-
tice which is very well known in British parliamentary law and which
the rules for the assemblies of preceding systems had instituted with-
out constitutional provision becomes constitutionalized. These ques-
tions by members of the Parliament may be either oral or written and
the minister concerned answers in the same way.
6 V. A. Demichel, De l'incompatibilit6 entre les fonctions de ministre et le
mandat parlementaire, R.D.P. 16 (1960).
7 Of 17 ministers (excluding secretaries of state) the cabinet of M. Michel Debr6
includes 9 "technicians" and 8 parliamentarians, who, moreover, have had to relinquish
their seats in conformity with article 23.
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Besides the vote of confidence in the government which will be
discussed later, these questions are the only means of control which
members of the Parliament have in regard to the government, partic-
ularly because the practice of calling for a closed questioning is
generally considered to have disappeared. In the course of the draw-
ing up of their own rules, however, both deputies and senators wished
to re-establish a practice which the second assembly (the Council
of the Republic), under the Fourth Republic, faced with an inability
to challenge the responsibility of the government, had successfully
created. The practice consists of the oral question put by a member
of Parliament to a minister, followed by a debate in which all inter-
ested members participate, and ending in a vote. It was hoped that
this procedure could be re-instituted in a prescribed manner without
being unconstitutional. Such a bill caused passionate debates in both
assemblies and came up against the hostility of the government. The
latter declared, in effect, that the only ways of challenging its respon-
sibility were those set forth in articles 49 and 50, which will be con-
sidered shortly. The oral question with debate re-established the
system of interpellations, or, better still, the "implicit question of con-
fidence" used under the Fourth Republic to censure the government
without utilizing constitutional procedures. To be sure, the govern-
ment is not legally required to resign, but it creates an unfavorable
prejudice against itself which diminishes its authority.
The opposition of the government led the parliamentarians to
adopt a compromise solution, but the bill of procedure kept the idea
of a proposal for a resolution which would end debate and call for a
vote. But the Parliament, as we shall see, no longer exercises complete
sovereignty relating to standing orders, and the rules of the assemblies
must be approved by the Constitutional Council. For motives indi-
cated above, this High Court refused to approve the passages relative
to proposals for resolution.'
Besides the oral and written questions which carry no sanctions,
the only ways to challenge the responsibility of the government are
therefore found in articles 49 and 50 of the constitution.
C. The Challenging of Ministerial Responsibility
Parliamentary practice under the Third and Fourth Republics
knew an infinite number of means for challenging this responsibility,
in direct or indirect, visible or invisible ways. This cleverness of the
parliamentarians may be listed among the other causes for the in-
8 Decision of the Constitutional Council published by the Journal officiel of July 3,
1959. See on this question D. Ruzie, "Le nouveau r~glement de l'Assembl~e nationale,"
R.D.P. 863 et seq. (1959).
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stability of ministries; and it persisted despite certain fragile barriers
which the constitution of 1946 tried to set up against it.
In the drafts for reform of that constitution an amelioration of
procedures, particularly in constraining the members of Parliament to
assume their responsibilities, had been strived for. Even the system
of disinvestiture had been proposed-with investiture provided for, in
the designation of a chancellor, by the Fundamental Law of Bonn
In fact articles 49 and 50 take up again in its general outline the plan
for revision set forth at the beginning of 1958 by the government
headed by M. F6lix Gaillard.
The responsibility of the ministers may now be engaged in three
ways:
1. The motion for censure (art. 49, par. 2). In this case chal-
lenging of responsibility comes from the National Assembly. The mo-
tion must be filed by at least one-tenth of the members of the
assembly. The vote takes place 48 hours after the filing (a practice
inspired by the constitution of 1946 and permitting reflection). Only
favorable votes are counted, that is to say that the deputies who ab-
stain are considered as against the motion. If the motion obtains a
majority of the votes of the members of the assembly, it is adopted
and the government is required to submit its resignation to the Presi-
dent of the Republic (art. 50). If it is not adopted, no other motion
can be adopted in the course of the session unless the government
takes the initiative of engaging its own responsibility.
2. The question of confidence on a text (art. 49, par. 3). In
order to have a bill which it favors passed, the government may be
led to put pressure on the Parliament by posing the question of con-
fidence. In this case "the text is considered as adopted, unless a
motion of censure, submitted within the next 24 hours, is passed"
under the same conditions as stated above.
3. The question of confidence on the government's program or
a declaration of general policy (art. 49, par. 1). After deliberation
of the Council of Ministers the Prime Minister may engage the
responsibility of his government before the National Assembly. In
this case there is no special procedure and the assembly votes in the
ordinary manner. But the government will use this procedure only
in exceptional cases: at the time of its inauguration (although it is
not legally bound to do so) and at a time when it is about to make
an important decision.
These procedures until now have been used very little. In two
years there have been only two moves to censure, which were rejected.
It might be said that the attempt to stabilize the parliamentary sys-
9 See La rvision constitutionelle devant le Parlement, R.D.P. 81 (1958).
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tern has succeeded if there were not other legal and factual reasons
which explain it better.
THE LIMITATION OF PARLIAMENTARY JURISDICTION IN REGARD
TO THE EXERCISE OF THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION
The constitution of 1958 limits parliamentary jurisdiction on
legislative matters in two ways: first by giving an essential place to
the government in legislative procedure, then by proceeding with a
radical division between legislative and statutory jurisdiction.
The Modifications of Legislative Procedure
Until 1958 this procedure was left entirely to the Parliament and
such a sovereignty had constantly caused demagogic debates in
numerous cases. The reforms brought about in this area by the
constitution of 1958 consisted of giving the government an important
if not preponderant role. In certain regards these reforms were in-
spired by British parliamentary procedure, but even in this case it
may be asked if the reaction was not too excessive in bringing about
a useless humiliation of the Parliament.
To be sure the members of Parliament have the right to initiate
legislation (art. 39), as does the government, but this equality very
quickly gives way to a supremacy in many areas.
It is true that the members of Parliament have the right of initia-
tive in legislative matters and the right of amendment. Article 40,
however, states that their proposals are unacceptable "if their adop-
tion would mean either a diminution of public resources or the crea-
tion of aggravation of a public burden." Felix Gaillard's proposal,
itself inspired by British parliamentary procedure, forbade the mem-
bers of the Parliament the initiative only in budgetary matters. Arti-
cle 40, on the other hand has a general compass which permits the
government to declare as unacceptable a great number of resolutions,
for it is obvious that the reason may be frequently invoked. This first
barrier, to which the government has frequent recourse, is manifestly
of such a nature as to diminish considerably parliamentary initiative.
Before 1958 the number of commissions stood at 19 and their
number might have been increased still more, for the figure depended
only on the regulations of the assemblies. Today, by virtue of
article 43 of the constitution, the number of commissions is limited to
6 in each assembly. Each one of these commissions thus has a con-
siderable membership, about one hundred deputies in the National
Assembly, and it is easy to understand that legislative work is not
readily accomplished, while the influence of the commissions is at
the same time decreased.
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According to article 48, paragraph 1, "the order of the day in
the assemblies will include by priority and in the order fixed by the
government the discussion of bills brought in by the government and
proposals of bills accepted by it." Thus the assemblies lose a preroga-
tive which they valued highly and which was the symbol of their
sovereignty: the control of their agenda. They had indeed abused
this control, especially under the Fourth Republic, but here again the
solution is too drastic, though it also is inspired in certain respects by
British practice.
Article 44 offers the government a weapon of great interest for
ending a debate in its own interest, a device which the government
until now has applied very broadly. If the government so demands
"the gagged assembly declares itself by a single vote on all or part
of a text under discussion, retaining only amendments proposed or
accepted by the government." This arrangement incontestably has
the advantage of avoiding disparate texts, but above all it permits
the government to stop a discussion in order to ask for an overall
vote and thus exert pressure on the deputies. Each time that it is
applied this arrangement arouses sharp criticism from the deputies
who feel themselves to be "under the thumb" of the government.
The Constitutional Council, however, has just accorded it the widest
possible scope."0
Finally, in budgetary matters, article 47 of the constitution states
that if the budget proposal has not been adopted within a period of
70 days by the Parliament, its conditions may be put in force by
ordinance. This step, taken against the demagogical budgetary prac-
tices followed for many years, is mainly intended to force the deputies
to act more strictly in this area. It is stated in the reform of budgetary
procedures instituted by the decree of June 19, 1956, and is today
governed by the organic ordinance of January, 1959.
The Division of Legislative and Rule Making Jurisdiction
In the French constitutional tradition the legislator is sovereign
because he is the expression of the national will. By this fact a law
which is voted by the Parliament may govern all matters and has a
universal application. Regulations adopted by the government thus
have, in principle, an inferior value, for the "executive power" is by
definition never primary."
This supremacy and universality of the legislator, however, kept
10 Decision of January 15, 1960, recorded in the Recueil Dalloz, 1960, p. 351 with
a note by M. LMo Hamon.
11 The theory of the law in French Constitutional Law has been perfectly stated
by R. Carr6 de Malberg, "La loi, expression de ]a volont6 gin6rale," Paris, 1932.
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running more and more into the material obstacles due particularly
to the increasingly technical aspect of legislation and the slowness of
legislative procedure. Such a situation from 1926 on had led the
governments to ask from Parliament the vote for "laws of full pow-
ers" permitting them to proceed by decree to reforms which should
have been the result of laws.
The practice of "delegated legislation" lacked, in France, any
theoretic basis since the legislative power by definition cannot be
delegated, Parliament being unable to delegate a jurisdiction which
belongs only to the people which it represents. In fact it terminated
in a veritable abdication on the part of the Parliament and had been
forbidden by article 13 of the constitution of 1946. Since 1946, though,
the practice of delegated legislation had reappeared, each govern-
ment demanding at the time of its investiture the vote for a law of
special powers assuring it of a few months of security and permitting
it to proceed with the most important reforms.
The constitution of 1958, by imitating the German or Italian
Constitutions or American or British practices, would have been able
to make the use of delegated legislation constitutional. The solution
adopted is broader. It is inspired by proposals made in 1946 before
the Constituant Assembly and discarded in the name of the sover-
eignty of the legislator.'"
Article 34 of the constitution sets up a list of the only matters
which may be the object of a law in their totality or in their funda-
mental principles. This list, which was rather short in the draft of
the constitution, has been lengthened and made more precise follow-
ing the examination of the draft by the Council of State. Concerned,
for example, are civil rights, nationality, the status of individuals,
penal procedure, etc .... 13 Matters other than those provided for in
article 34 have a statutory character (art. 37), that is, the govern-
ment is free to regulate them by decree, in the same way that it may
also modify by decree previous laws interposed into these non-legis-
lative matters. 4
The list in article 34 is not, however, a rigid list. It may be added
to by an organic law passed by the Parliament (art. 34 in fine). Thus,
according to the desires of Parliament, the number of matters which
are reserved to it may be increased and in this way parliamentary
sovereignty is indirectly safeguarded.
12 See J. de Soto, "La loi et le r~glement dans la Constitution du 4 octobre
1958," R.D.P. 240 (1959); M. Waline, "Les rapports entre la loi et le riglement avant
et apris la Constitution de 1958," R.D.P. 699 (1959).
13 See the text of article 34 in the appendix.
14 On this subject see the decision of the Constitutional Council published in the
Journal officiel of December 2, 1959.
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But on the other hand this list may be temporarily restricted.
In fact the constitution of 1958 makes the use of laws of special
powers unconstitutional. With the new division of legislative and
statutory jurisdiction such a practice might have seemed useless. Ar-
ticle 38, however, permits the government, "for the execution of its
program, (to) ask Parliament for authorization to take measures,
during a limited period, which are normally the function of law."
Without having become as frequent as before 1958, this practice is
thus used again. Its most obvious manifestation may be seen in the
law of February 4, 1960, authorizing the government to take certain
measures relative to maintaining order, safeguarding the nation, and
the pacification and administration of Algeria.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL
The establishment of a new and more complex relationship be-
tween Parliament and the government was to necessitate the creation
of a regulatory body. To answer this need the Constitutional Council
was created by articles 56 and following of the constitution. At first
glance one might have believed that with this provision France would
have a competent judicial body to pass on the constitutionality of
laws, as in the United States or the German Federal Republic. The
developments which follow shall show that such is not the case, for
neither in its competence nor in its composition may the Constitutional
Council be compared to the Supreme Court of the United States. 15
Composition
The Constitutional Council is made up of nine members each of
whose term lasts nine years and is not renewable. One third of the
body changes every three years (art. 56). In addition former presi-
dents of the Republic belong to this council. In all, then, the council
contains eleven members, with the two former Presidents of the
Republic, Vincent Auriol and Ren6 Coty.
If the former presidents, whose presence is beyond question,
be excepted, the composition of the council is still essentially political,
for it includes three members named by the President of the Republic,
three named by the President of the National Assembly and three by
the President of the Senate. The designation of the members has
accentuated this character, for it has become obvious that they were
appointed less for their judicial competence than for a certain political
1 It is astonishing that the Constitutional Committee has not yet been the sub-
ject of a study. On the problem of the control of the constitutionality of laws in
France, see J. Lemasurier, "La Constitution de 1946 et le contr6le du lgislateur,"
Paris, 1954.
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"dosage." The letter of May 25, 1960, in which President Auriol
announced that he would no longer attend the meetings is the sign
of an uneasiness due to an overly political make-up of the Council.16
Powers
The idea of a control of the constitutionality of laws is quite
contrary to the French constitutional tradition for two reasons: the
legislator, who expresses the national wills, is sovereign in such a way
that a censure by any jurisdiction, no matter how high, is inadmis-
sible; on the other hand the judge does not create law as in the
countries of common law. On the contrary he has the function of
assuring that laws be applied. These two factors, exactly the opposites
of those which prevail in the United States, explain why the French
people, at all periods, and French legal philosophy have never wished
to permit control of the constitutionality of laws by the courts.'T
The creation of the Constitutional Committee by the constitution
of 1946 did not break with this tradition, for this committee, which
had practically never functioned, was in fact intended to control con-
flicts between the two legislative assemblies.
Conversely, the Constitutional Council that was created in 1958
was presented as an important mechanism of the new political sys-
tem. Its powers are fixed by articles 58 and following of the consti-
tution, supplemented by the organic ordinance of November 7, 1958.
They may be grouped under three headings.
A. Electoral Jurisdiction
The Constitutional Council oversees the conduct of election of
the President of the Republic. It examines claims and announces the
results of the voting (art. 58).
In the same vein it is empowered to assure the regularity of oper-
ations of the referendum and to announce the results (art. 60).
Finally, it is the judge of "electoral disputes," passing on all
contests which arise during the election of deputies and senators.
Traditionally this power belonged until 1958 to each chamber, which,
by reason of the sovereignty of Parliament, was the judge of its own
elections. But such a power often gave rise to the handing down of
decisions which were based more on political than judicial consider-
ations. Certain election annulments passed down during the general
elections of 1956 in particular showed what abuses may be committed
in this area. Inspired at least in part by the system in force in Eng-
land, the authors of the constitution wished to avoid such abuses. The
16 See the text of this letter in Le Monde July 3-4, 1960.
17 See Carr6 de Malberg, op. cit., 103 ff. J. Lemasurier, op. cit, passim.
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solution adopted will be good if the Constitutional Council is able, on
this point, to create a tradition and a jurisprudence.
B. Automatic Examination of the Regularity of Organic Laws
and of the Statutes of the Assemblies
According to article 61, paragraph 1, "organic laws, before their
promulgation, and the standing orders of the parliamentary assem-
blies, before their institution, must be submitted to the Constitutional
Council which passes on their constitutionality."
Organic laws are those which have as an object the planning of
the institutions provided for by the constitution. They must be
adopted after a period of fifteen days following the introduction of
the bill or the proposal according to certain rules of procedure speci-
fied in article 45. But above all they may be promulgated only if
the Constitutional Council has declared them to be in conformity
with the constitution. Beyond all dispute the Constitutional Council
is thus given a sort of "supra-legislative" power which reduces the
parliamentary authority accordingly. What would happen, for ex-
ample, if the Parliament, in accordance with article 34, should wish
to increase the number of matters which are reserved to it?
In the same way the council automatically controls the regularity
of the rules of the assemblies, and the rather restrictive solution which
it adopted in regard to oral questions with debate has already been
shown.
C. Control of the Constitutionality of Laws. (art. 61, par. 2)
This is the essential competence of the Constitutional Council: it
decides in effect if a law is in conformity with the constitution. But
in this regard one cannot speak of true control of the constitutionality
of laws for two reasons. First of all because laws are submitted
to the council "before their promulgation," that is before they have
been put into effect. Secondly because the council may be called
upon by only four persons: the President of the Republic, the Prime
Minister, and the President of each assembly. In fact, as article 41
of the constitution shows, the Constitutional Council has as a prin-
cipal function the decision of conflicts between the government and
Parliament in regard to the new division of legislative and rule mak-
ing powers.:' It is difficult to conceive, for example, that a law be
18 Art. 41: "If it appears in the course of legislative procedure that a proposal or
an amendment is not in the domain of the law or is contrary to a delegation accorded
under the terms of article 38, the government may pose the question of its inadmissibility.
"In case of disagreement between the government and the President of the assembly
concerned, the Constitutional Council, at one or the other's request, decides within a
period of eight days."
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referred to the council for violation of the general principles con-
tained in the Preamble or called up by it."9 In any case, a provision
declared unconstitutional may not be promulgated nor put into force
(art. 62). The decisions of the council are not subject to appeal and
apply to all administrative and jurisdictional authorities (art. 62).
CONCLUSION
The overall impression which prevails after these new arrange-
ments of the relationship between the government and the Parliament
is a lowering of parliamentary prerogatives. To be sure such a tend-
ency is rather general and may be seen, in law and in fact, in the
present parliamentary practice in Germany and in England. It is
accentuated in France by the fact that in the elections of 1958 the
U.N.R., the party favorable to General De Gaulle, obtained a con-
siderable majority and since that time the government has always
enjoyed a rather large majority. The fact that people have been
able to speak of the "chambre introuvable," thinking of the ultra-
royalist chamber elected in 1815, is symptomatic, although the com-
parison is exaggerated. But it is certain in any case that this situation
has lowered the constitutional position of the Parliament and given
some pliancy to the system. 0
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
It was said of the constitution of 1875 that it was "a Senate."
It may be said of the constitution of 1958 that it is "a President."
This pre-eminent position of the President of the Republic is formally
expressed, moreover, since the articles which concern him head up
the constitution (art. 5-19).
Nor has General De Gaulle ever hidden the conception that he
had of the Republic; but it seems that under the pressure of circum-
stances and perhaps also through the evolution of his thought, such
a conception has been transformed in the direction of an increase
in the rights accorded to the Chief of State.
In the speech given at Bayeux on June 16, 1946, at the time when
the Constituent Assembly was deliberating on the draft which was
going to become the constitution of 1946, General De Gaulle stated:
19 See on this subject R. Drago, note under the Council of State June 26, 1959,
Syndicat g6n6ral des ing6nieurs conseils, Rec. Sirey 102 (1959).
20 On parliamentary activity see the report of MM. L. Hamon and J. M. Cotteret,
R.D.P. 648 (1960).
It has not been possible in the framework of this study to examine the statutes of
the Senate. See on this subject J. Roche, Le S6nat de la Ripublique dans la Consti-
tution de 1958, R.D.P. 1126 (1959).
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It is from the Chief of State, placed above parties, elected by a
college which includes the Parliament but is much broader and
composed in such a way as to make him President of the French
Union as well as of the Republic, that the power of the executive
should proceed. It is up to the Chief of State to serve the general
interest in the choice of men with an orientation independent of
the Parliament. His is the authority for naming ministers and first
of all, of course, the Premier who is to direct the policy and the
work of the Government. It is the function of the Chief of State
to promulgate the laws and make decrees, which commit the state.
His is the task of presiding over the councils of government and
exercising that influence of continuity without which a nation can-
not get along. His is the power of serving as arbiter over political
contingencies, either normally through the council, or, in moments
of serious confusion, by inviting the country to make its sovereign
decision known through elections. It is up to him, if the country
should be in peril, to be the guarantor of national independence
and of treaties concluded by France.
21
But in the very text of his m6moires published in 1959, General
De Gaulle has a more precise notion of the presidential office.
In my opinion, the State must have a head, that is to say a chief,
in whom the nation may envisage, above fluctuations, the man in
charge of the essentials and the guarantor of its destinies...
Beyond the circumstances in which it would be up to the President
to intervene publicly, government and Parliament would have to
collaborate, the latter controlling the former and being able to
overthrow it, but the national magistrate exercising his arbitration
and having the power to appeal to that of the people.22
Bearing in mind such a conception of the Presidency it behooves
us to study what the office of President of the Republic is according
to the text of the constitution and what the practice has been since
1958.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF 1958
If the position of the President of the Republic is preeminent in
the text of 1958, it is nevertheless in conformity, on many points, with
the classical conception of the Chief of State in the parliamentary
system. It departs from it, however, on certain points concerning
personal powers not to be expected in a parliamentary regime.
I. Designation of the President of the Republic
Republican parliamentary systems have never been able to solve
satisfactorily the problem of the Chief of State. Born into a monar-
21 Speech published in the appendix to the "WMmoires de guerre" of General De
Gaulle, t. II 651 (1959).
22 C. De Gaulle, "M6moires de guerre," t. III 240 (1959).
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chical system, the parliamentary system needs a monarch who assures
the continuity of the state though he exercises no effective govern-
mental powers. Under the Third and Fourth Republics the President
of the Republic was elected by the two houses of Parliament. It
must be said that, even in the cases in which the election was difficult,
this manner of designation had never harmed the moral authority of
the President, as much because of the idea which he had of his duties
as because of a sort of implicit agreement among the parties.
Following in this respect the ideas of General De Gaulle ex-
pressed in the speech at Bayeux, the authors of the Constitution of
1958 nevertheless preferred election by an enlarged electoral college
composed of the members of Parliament (695), the members of the
departmental assemblies (3,149), and the representatives of the
municipal assemblies (72,466). This electoral college had the effect
of giving an advantage to the municipalities, particularly the rural
ones, of approximately 80,000 electors, there were roughly 31,000
mayors of small communities.
In theory the make-up of this electoral college seems rather
representative of France and perhaps of such a nature as to reinforce
the position of the President of the Republic. It certainly has no
drawbacks when the candidate is a personality of first rate stature
who is known throughout the whole nation. 3 But in the case in which
no personality could really impose itself, the run-off elections (art. 7)
can give surprising results as a consequence of the rather incoherent
electoral body. When the election was the task of the two chambers
of Parliament, an agreement could be reached more easily.
In fact this electoral system will lead the parties or their coali-
tions to seek, as in the United States, candidates who are sufficiently
symbolic and who can exercise great authority on the country as a
whole. However that may be, if it is continued, it will bring about a
radical change of political customs in this area.
II. Powers of the President of the Republic24
The powers of the President are summed up in article 5 of the
constitution: "The President of the Republic sees to it that the Consti-
tution is respected. He guarantees, through his arbitration, the regular
functioning of public powers as well as the continuity of the state. He
is the guarantor of national independence, of territorial integrity, of
respect for community agreements and treaties."
This text, however, does not point out that the powers of the
23 In December 1958 General De Gaulle obtained 62,394 of the 79,471 votes cast.
24 See G. Berlia, "Le Pr6sident de ]a Ripublique dans la Constitution de 1958,"
R.D.P. 71 (1959); "Les pouvoirs du President de la R~publique comme gardien de la
Constitution," R.D.P. 565 (1959).
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President-and this is perhaps the essential innovation of the consti-
tution-are of two kinds. Some are traditional in the parliamentary
system and thus require a ministerial counter-signature. But the
others are personal and already show a profound change in the con-
ception of the presidential office.
A. Powers Submitted to Countersignature
In principle, these powers are nominal, for the countersignature
is the sign of ministerial responsibility. Article 20 of the constitution
states, moreover, that the government "determines and conducts the
policy of the Nation" and that it is responsible before Parliament.
It does not seem necessary to dwell at length on these powers
which are traditional in the parliamentary system: the promulgation
of laws, signature of ordinances and decrees, nomination of public
officials, etc ....
B. Personal Powers
These powers are the more important because the President of
the Republic has not yet used them. Their personal character results
from the fact that they are not submitted to countersignature (art. 19).
Certainly the nomination of the Prime Minister (art. 8) may be
left out of the discussion, for in the traditional conception of the
parliamentary system, this choice belongs to the Chief of State. The
countersignature, when it exists, has no formal significance and does
not modify this power to choose. But it is otherwise with other per-
sonal powers of the president.
1. The referendum (art. 11). On the proposal of the govern-
ment during sessions or on the joint proposal of the two assemblies,
the President may submit for referendum any bill "bearing on the
organization of public powers, bearing on the approval of a Com-
munity agreement or tending to authorize the ratification of a treaty
which, without being contrary to the constitution, would have effects
on the functioning of its institutions."
It is obvious from the text that the President is not legally re-
quired to defer to the petitions which are submitted to him. This
power of submitting a bill to referendum permits the country to decide
on important texts, in regard, for example, to European organization.
There is a danger, however, that by means of the referendum the
nation may be placed in opposition to the Parliament, which is legally
its representative.
2. The right of dissolution (art. 12). This right is the very
essence of the parliamentary system since it permits the people to
settle the differences which might exist between the government and
the Parliament. But in the traditional parliamentary system this
1960]
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right is granted to the government and is expressed in the counter-
signature as is the case in England. As soon as the exercise of the
right of dissolution is no longer combined with the countersignature,
it may be considered, though wrongly, as a means for the President
of the Republic to have his personal policies approved. If the new
elections decide against him he thus risks a considerable loss of pres-
tige which would make his constitutional position difficult. Such was
the case when Marshal MacMahon decided to dissolve the Chamber
of Deputies.
It is possible, however, that the use of the right of dissolution
may be henceforth considered in the perspective of the "national
arbitration" which the President wishes to guarantee. To General
De Gaulle, for example, is often attributed the intention of dissolving
the assembly if its present government should lose its majority. It is
a fact that this intention, which is quite hypothetical, is a factor in the
stability of the government. But at the same time, such a dissolution,
though it would have an obvious political significance, would not have
as an aim, (if the developments during the last two years are con-
sidered), the maintenance of a governmental team in power at any
cost. In other words there is perhaps in this arrangement the begin-
ning of an element of transformation of the parliamentary system
toward more stability.
3. The powers of the President in exceptional times (art. 16).
The President may dispose of all powers, without control, if "the
institutions of the Republic, the independence of the nation, its terri-
torial integrity, or the execution of international commitments are
threatened in a serious and immediate manner and if the regular func-
tioning of public constitutional powers is interrupted."
In the minds of the authors of the constitution this disposition
is destined to permit the functioning of the system in case of events
of exceptional gravity, as, for example, those of 1940. But inevitably
the abuses that such a text might permit spring to mind, abuses such
as those allowed by article 14 of the Charte de 1814 or article 48 of
the Weimar Constitution. Everything obviously depends on the man
who will use the powers, but their very existence, without guarantees,
might legitimately cause anxiety, all the more so because in excep-
tional cases the court has always approved broader powers for the
government.25
It is quite symptomatic that the President of the Republic has
not as yet used these personal prerogatives.2 Nevertheless the regime
25 See A. Mathiot, "La th~orie des circonstances exceptionelles," M6Ianges Mestre,
1956, p. 413 and the bibliography cited.
26 The decisions of the President are again not submitted to the countersignature
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instituted in 1958 has followed a development different from that
which the texts seemed to indicate and this development is principally
due to the personal attitude of General De Gaulle and the concept
he has of the Presidency of the Republic.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE
AND OF THE REGI=E SINCE 1958
It is essential to make a certain number of preliminary remarks.
First of all it is inaccurate, starting from a few unhappy pre-
cedents, to consider that the role of the Chief of State in a parliamen-
tary regime is a role of pure representation. From his very position
he is capable of having a considerable if unnoticeable influence on the
action of the government, of watching over the permanent interests
of the State and assuring the functioning of the institutions. Under
the Fourth Republic no one had a clearer conception of this role of
the Presidency than M. Vincent Auriol
Next it must be stated that today more than ever, and even in
the most democratic regimes, the power of the president is personified
in a man. Moreover, as we have already noted, the re-inforcement of
the executive is a general tendency of representative systems. The
traditional elements of the representative system might have been con-
ceived in a stable world but they seem inadequate in the presence
of the major problems with which the nations find themselves con-
fronted every day. The evolution of British parliamentarianism in this
respect is significant.
Such being the case it appears incontestable that the function
of "arbitration" provided for by article 5 has taken a significance
which could not be attributed to it in 1958. In this respect the speech
delivered at Brest on September 7, 196028 by General De Gaulle is
significant: "... France finds itself in a situation in which the Chief
of State directs the State, the government governs and the Parliament
deliberates and legislates. . . " This "direction of the State" is ob-
viously something else than the simple moral magistracy to which
the office of Chief of State was reduced in a parliamentary regime.
It would be desirable at this point to draw up a list of the prac-
tices followed since 1958 in the relationship between the President
of the Republic and the Parliament as well as in purely governmental
action.
when he presents messages to the Parliament (art. 18) when he names the three mem-
bers of the Constitutional Council whom he is to name and when he refers a matter
to the Constitutional Council. (arts. 54, 61).
27 See R. Drago, "L'article 32 de la Constitution du 27 octobre 1946," R.D.P.
157 (1953).
28 See Le Monde, September 9, 1960.
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The President of the Republic and the Parliament
Here we are confronted with an area in which the action as such
of the President of the Republic has least manifested itself. Never-
theless two, facts are particularly important and deserve to be pointed
out.
Following the events of Algiers in January, 1960 the government
asked the Parliament, in conformity with article 38, for the right to
issue ordinances in legislative matters to assure the maintenance of
order and the security of the State. Thus the law of February 4,
1960, which was mentioned above, was passed. But the Parliament
deemed it necessary to stipulate that these ordinances would be made
"under the signature of General De Gaulle, President of the Repub-
lic." The mention was useless since by virtue of article 13 the ordi-
nances passed by the Council of Ministers are, in fact, signed by the
President of the Republic (and also countersigned by the Prime
Minister and the minister concerned). But by this arrangement the
Parliament intended to show that it placed confidence in the person of
General De Gaulle and by this very fact it placed itself outside the
constitutional framework since the President of the Republic is not
responsible (art. 68).
According to article 29 of the constitution, the Parliament is
called into extraordinary session at the request of the Prime Minister
or the majority of the members of the National Assembly. The ses-
sion is opened and closed by decree (countersigned) by the President
of the Republic (art. 30).
In the month of March, 1960 a majority of the deputies having
requested an extraordinary session on agricultural problems, the
President of the National Assembly referred it to the President of the
Republic; but the latter refused to call Parliament into session, stat-
ing that a premature meeting would be inopportune.
Such a decision was certainly contrary to the constitution, for
both precedent and the text of article 29, as well as previous practice
and the spirit of the system of sessions itself, showed that the power
of the President could not be discretionary.29 Doubtless in the name
of national arbitration General De Gaulle wished to make sure that
the Chief of State refused to accept this interpretation.
Governmental Action
This governmental action of the President of the Republic is
manifested in numerous ways. The "direction of the State" and the
"public intervention" of the Chief of State are today confirmed by a
certain number of acts which give his stamp to the political order.
29 See G. Berlia, "La convocation d'une session extraordinaire du Parlement et
Ia nature du rigime," R.D.P. 303 (1960).
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It has already been pointed out that the great number of "tech-
nicians" composing the governmental team implied a weakening of
the parliamentary system. To this must be added the forming of
"committees" presided over by the Chief of State, composed of minis-
ters and high functionaries and in which questions of general policy
are deliberated. Included are the committees on Algerian affairs, on
community affairs and on foreign affairs.
There are, however, in particular two unequivocal manifesta-
tions of this governmental trend: on the one hand the press con-
ferences, messages and communiques which imply an effective and
determined participation by General De Gaulle in general policy,
and on the other hand the personal meetings with foreign statesmen
invested with governmental responsibilities, whether it were President
Eisenhower, Mr. MacMillan or Mr. Khrushchev. In all these cases the
President acts alone and it is his policy which he states. It is obviously
rather paradoxical to hear a Chief of State who is not responsible
proclaim, for example, in a message to the armed forces on October 28,
1959, "Under my responsibility and with full knowledge of the facts
I have determined our action in Algeria."
An unequivocal explanation of this attitude is given by President
Chaban-Delmas of the National Assembly, secretary-general of the
U.N.R. at the congress of his party in Bordeaux in November, 1959.
"There will be henceforth two sectors," he stated, "a presidential
sector and an open sector. The presidential sector includes: Algeria
with the Sahara, the Franco-African Community, foreign affairs and
defense. The open sector includes the rest, which is considerable...
In the first sector, the presidential sector, the government executes;
in the second, it decides its own course."
Nothing could be clearer, though the explanation by M. Chaban-
Delmas must obviously not be considered an official thesis.
But on the other hand the parliamentary regime continues to
see its procedures applied. And if the members of parliament criticize
the policies of the President, they address their grievances to the
government, declaring that they do not wish to know who has the
responsibility of action, the government alone being responsible. In
particular, such was the attitude of the National Assembly in the
course of the debate on Algeria in October 1959.
It would obviously be unworthy of a jurist to try to make these
practices coincide with the text of the constitution. It is certain,
above all, that they rest on an equivocation on the meaning of the
word "government." If the Chief of State directs the state and the
government governs, it is doubtless conceivable in the mind of General
De Gaulle that if the country is confronted with major problems like
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those of the present moment, certain political decisions belong to the
"direction of the State." On the other hand the former abuses of a
parliamentarianism which was confined to Assembly rule might legiti-
mately cause one to hope for more firmness in the exercise of the
executive office, a firmness that requires the support of the Chief of
State.
The governmental action of the President of the Republic, how-
ever, is incontestably extra-constitutional. And this action can be
pursued only because General De Gaulle benefits from a favorable
position vis-a-vis the government, the Parliament and the country. A
change in this combination of circumstances might make the political
practices followed since 1958 seem precarious.
CONCLUSION: THE NATURE OF THE REGIME
It is always vain to wish to pass an impartial judgment on politi-
cal institutions at the very time when these institutions are in force.
It will be attempted here to draw a few conclusions with all the
scientific objectivity necessary for such a study.
1. It is certain that General De Gaulle does not have the tradi-
tional concept of a constitution that has been held in France since
1789, that of a barrier against the abuse of power. He has, if you will,
a "British" concept of a constitutional regime, that which he set
forth in April 1960 before the Westminster Parliament: "Without
scrupulously written constitutional texts, but, by means of an irre-
cusable general consent, you find the means of assuring, on every
occasion, the proper functioning of democracy without incurring
either the excessive criticism of the ambitious or the frowning dis-
approval of lawyers."
This feeling no doubt explains that considerations of efficiency
are more important to him than legal rules whose meaning is always
susceptible to change.
2. In the speech of presentation of the constitutional text be-
fore the General Assembly of the Council of State,30 M. Michel Debr6
stated that the system provided for by the constitution was half-way
between the parliamentary system and the presidential system. But
the constitutional practices since 1958 belie this statement, for the
presidential system presupposes a parliament entirely free from presi-
dential actions, which is not the case.3 '
3. "Popular consent"; th; support sought by General De Gaulle
in public opinion, the assent given by a considerable majority to the
30 R.F.S.P. 1959, no. 1.
31 See G. Berlia, loc. cit., p. 309.
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constitutional draft which he supported, clearly recalls the "Caesarian
democracy," which also found its justification in popular support.32
But this popular support given to a man no longer has the dis-
advantages which it had in the nineteenth century by reason of the
international repercussions of any governmental action and of the
development of the means of expression and the political organization
of the citizens. In his masterful Pouvoir - Les genies invisibles de la
CitM, Guglielmo Ferrero stated that democracy could live only on con-
dition that two principles be respected: the right of opposition and
freedom to vote. At the present time these two principles are re-
spected, and, as was pointed out earlier, the democratic character of
the regime cannot be questioned.
4. The observer thus finds himself, perhaps in spite of himself,
led back to the parliamentary system. Is it really a paradox to say
that the system is parliamentary, and would it not be better, as certain
people propose, frankly to revise the constitution and institute a
French form of the presidential system?33
It has often been pointed out in regard to the constitution of 1958
that the parliamentary regime instituted was the "dualist parliamen-
tarianism" which France had practiced from 1830 to 1848: the gov-
ernment serves as a link between a Chief of State and a Parliament
which both play an effective role. This rapprochement would be a
regression only if the political conditions were similar, whereas what
has been said above shows that such a parliamentarianism is capable
of being applied to a much more democratic regime.
It is, however, a rapprochement which very few have made. A
rereading of the constitution of 1875 will show that the powers of the
President of the Republic are much broader than in that of 1958.
And the presidential office from 1875 to 1879 was not a simple
magistracy of influence. To be sure, after the presidency of Gr6vy
the role of the President was weakened as a reaction to the policies
of MacMahon. But this means only that such a concept of parliamen-
tarianism is difficult to manage, not that it is inapplicable. There are
mistakes which the leaders of the Fifth Republic must not make and
the future of the system which they have founded depends finally
on them.
5. The care which the authors of the constitution of 1958 took
to follow British parliamentarianism is obvious. It is absolutely
certain now that the Westminster Parliament is above all a tribune
32 See M. Prelot, "La signification constitutionelle du Second Empire," R.F.S.P.
31 (1953).
33 The proposals along these lines were made previous to 1958. See in particular
G. Vedel, "Libfrer I'Executif, sinon organiser les partis," in Fiddration, August-Sep-
tember, 1955.
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and that the government, in it, exercises a preponderant if not ex-
clusive power, its responsibility being questioned only at the time of
general elections. The combining of such a system with a republican
system is not an easy thing to do.
Certainly the French political system today possesses some "con-
stitutional gaps" which doubtlessly shock the French more than
foreigners. But must they not be considered to correspond with a
set of political circumstances and thus to permit France to pass
through a difficult moment in its history?34
It has already been pointed out that the strengthening of the
executive is today a tendency characteristic of all democratic regimes.
It is not therefore surprising to note it in France in spite of certain
mistakes which could have been avoided. It is clear that the political
system in France is a system in search of itself. But between the abdi-
cation of the people and parliamentary demagoguery there is a middle
road which the constitution of 1958 should permit us to find.
APPENDIX
Article 34
Laws are passed by the Parliament.
Laws determine regulations concerning: -civil rights and the funda-
mental guarantees granted to the citizens for the exercise of public liberties;
the constraints imposed by National Defense on the persons and goods of
the citizens; -nationality, the status and competency of persons, matrimo-
nial laws, inheritances and gifts; -the determination of crimes and mis-
demeanors as well as the penalties which are assigued to them; penal pro-
cedure; amnesty; the creation of new judicial orders and the status of
magistrates; -the basis of taxes, tax rates and the methods of collection
of assessments of all kinds; the regulation of currency.
Laws also determine regulations concerning: -the electoral system of
the parliamentary assemblies and of local assemblies; -the creation of
categories of public establishments; -the fundamental guarantees granted
to civil and military functionaries of the State; -the nationalization of
enterprises and the transfer of property from the public to the private sector.
Laws determine the fundamental principles: -of the general organiza-
tion of National Defense; -- of the free administration of local collectivities,
of their competencies and of their resources; -of teaching; -of the regu-
lation of property, monetary privileges and civil and commercial obligations;
-of the right to work, the right to unionize and social security.
Financial laws determine the resources and the obligations of the State
in the conditions and under the reservations provided for by an organic law.
Laws of policy determine the objectives of the economic and social
actions of the State.
The dispositions of the present article may be defined more accurately
and complemented by an organic law.
34 Certainly the present regime offers some characteristics of a "provisory regime,"
of a "mission" conferred by the people on General De Gaulle. See G. Berlia, loc. cit.,
p. 314.
